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The World Health Organization defines female genital cutting as any procedure that removes
or otherwise injures any part of a female’s external genitalia for non-medical reasons (1). Fe-
males are typically cut when they are young girls. Although different forms of cutting exist,
the most aggressive forms involve extensive tissue removal followed by a procedure known
as infibulation. To infibulate a female, the wounds produced by cutting are sewn up so that
they heal to leave only a small opening for urine and menstrual blood. Female genital cutting
brings no documented health benefits, and it can lead to serious health problems throughout
life. These health problems include severe pain, bleeding, infection, psychological trauma, in-
fertility, and a variety of obstetric complications that in the worst cases lead to death. In Sudan,
as but one example, obstetric complications related to cutting account for approximately 1% of
all government health spending on women between the ages of 15 and 49 (2). More broadly,
across six African countries, a single cohort of 15-year-old girls is expected to lose altogether
nearly 130,000 years of life because of problems during pregnancy and childbirth due to genital
cutting (2).
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The prevailing view of female genital cutting is that the practice is a social norm that evolved
culturally within the context of a coordination game (3–11). Development agencies spend mil-
lions of dollars every year for programs based on this model (10, 12–14). Although the details
vary considerably, these programs share the assumption that coordination incentives play a key
role in perpetuating female genital cutting, and they also play a key role in leading people to
abandon the practice. Moreover, the social norms approach and its emphasis on coordination
have spread from an initial focus on female genital cutting to other domains where development
organizations would like to promote changes in behavior (7,9, 10, 14, 15).
The coordination game approach to female genital cutting can be illustrated with the fol-
lowing simple model related to families and the marriage of their children (3, 6, 8, 16). Assume
that families have sons and daughters. Some families cut their daughters and demand cut wives
for their sons. We will call this the “cutting” strategy. Other families do not cut their daughters,
and they demand uncut wives for their sons. This is the “non-cutting” strategy. If a family cuts,
family members pay a total cost of c > 0. This cost includes the daughter’s pain, psycholog-
ical trauma, and risk of infection, infertility, or death. It also includes any medical expenses
associated with treating the daughter’s health problems.
As sons and daughters reach a marriageable age, families would like them to find suitable
partners. Families are randomly matched for their sons and daughters to consider potential mar-
riages. A successful marriage brings a total benefit of b > c to the family. This benefit includes
the prestige from successful reproductive matches in natalist societies. It further includes advan-
tages like increased social influence and risk spreading that result when families use marriage
to create or strengthen alliances. If a marriage is not successful or does not happen, the families
involved receive no benefit. For a match to result in a successful marriage, the two families
must have the same strategy. This is the key to coordination. A successful marriage requires
that matched families have the same practices and demands related to cutting, regardless of
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whether these practices and demands favor cutting or not cutting.
Under this simple model, two cutting families that are matched each get a payoff of b − c.
Two non-cutting families that are matched each get a payoff of b. If two families with different
practices are matched, the cutting family gets −c, and the non-cutting family gets 0. Finally,
to generate dynamics, families update their strategies over time, and at some positive rate they
adopt the strategy with the highest expected payoff. This model has three equilibria (Fig. 1).
Namely, all families cut, no families cut, or a specific intermediate proportion of families cut.
In the latter case, the equilibrium proportion of families cutting is (b + c)/(2b). Of the three
equilibria, only the two pure equilibria are dynamically stable; the mixed equilibrium is unstable
(Fig. 1). Consequently, within a group of intermarrying families, the model predicts that either
all families cut or none of them do. Within a group, behavior and the demands that families
bring to the marriage pool are homogeneous in equilibrium, and for this reason they constitute
a social norm that efficiently facilitates coordination. Once a norm is in place, no family can
afford to deviate unilaterally, and so the norm can potentially persist for a very long time. This is
true even if the norm in question is cutting, which yields a lower payoff for all families than the
non-cutting norm. To see this, consider an individual family facing a group in which all other
families cut. If the family in question does not cut its daughters, the payoff will be 0. If it does
cut, the payoff will be b− c > 0. Importantly, the theoretical prediction of homogeneity within
groups holds under assumptions much more general and realistic (17) than those presented in
this simple model.
The coordination game logic has been extremely influential both among researchers with an
interest in the cultural evolution of social norms (3, 6, 18–20) and among practitioners with an
applied interest in cutting as a health risk and a violation of children’s rights (4–8,10,11,14). In
particular, for several years the social norms approach and its emphasis on coordination incen-
tives have been a dominant theoretical framework for programs promoting the abandonment of
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female genital cutting (5, 7–10, 14). The key idea is that no single family can afford to deviate
from the cutting norm because the chance would be too high that the children of the family do
not grow up to find marriage partners (5–7,14). However, if a sufficient number of families de-
viate in a multilateral fashion, this problem disappears. More formally, if a program promoting
abandonment can convince enough families to stop cutting simultaneously, this multilateral de-
viation will shift the population into the basin of attraction for the non-cutting equilibrium (5,7).
Provided this deviation is somehow public (9,10,14), the families who still cut will update their
beliefs about the distribution of cutting practices in the group. These families will then realize
they would be better off if they also stopped cutting. Cutting quickly disappears at this point as
endogenous social dynamics ensure that finding marriage partners from non-cutting families is
increasingly easy to do.
Programs based on this model can take various forms, but they have certain common fea-
tures. Development workers usually invest in local projects at the community level. Along
with other development activities, these workers gradually try to convince families to abandon
female genital cutting and publicly declare that they have done so. Once the development work-
ers estimate that they have assembled a sufficient number of families in a community, they have
a public declaration (8–10, 14). This is typically a large celebratory festival in which the fam-
ilies in question publicly declare that they will no longer cut their daughters. The hope is that
this public declaration will lead the remaining families who cut to update their beliefs and thus
realize that abandoning the practice is now in their own interests. If this happens, cutting should
disappear relatively quickly because social interactions among families now work in favor of
abandonment.
Surprisingly, given the development funds at stake, no one has ever provided data clearly
showing that female genital cutting exhibits the characteristics of a social norm based on co-
ordination. In particular, if coordination is an appropriate theoretical framework, two related
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predictions hold. First, groups should have extreme cutting rates near zero or one. Second,
if cutting practices vary, the variation should be primarily between groups, not within groups.
These predictions follow directly from the model outlined above (Fig. 1) in which any mix of
strategies within a group is unstable, and thus a group only stabilizes culturally if everyone cuts
or if no one cuts. By extension, if behavioral variation exists, it must be between groups, not
within groups.
To see if such a pattern can be detected for female genital cutting, we collected data with
approximately 2300 girls entering primary school for the first time in 45 different communities
in the state of Gezira, Sudan. Children enter primary school in Sudan at the age of six, and
school begins in Gezira in late June. In addition, the Gezira state government hires doctors at
the beginning of each school year to give basic medical exams to all children entering primary
school. To develop a novel and culturally appropriate method for reliably estimating cutting
rates by community, we added two simple steps to this medical exam.
Novel methods are necessary (21) because existing methods rely heavily on surveys that
simply ask parents about cutting (22). The risk with such methods is that adult respondents
know that governmental and non-governmental workers asking about cutting probably have a
social and political agenda of some sort. As a result, respondents might misrepresent their true
practices and attitudes in various ways and for various reasons. The net effect of potential biases
is not known, and so we have little sense of how reliable existing survey methods are.
We took a different approach. In late June and early July of 2013, nine teams of professional
photographers and medical doctors visited 45 schools in the state of Gezira, one school in each
of the 45 communities in our study. Importantly, girls in Gezira are typically cut during the
summer vacation just before entering primary school or earlier. Henna is almost always applied
to a girl’s feet when she is cut, and this is the only time in a young girl’s life when henna
is applied. The presence of henna is thus an important and extremely reliable signal that a
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young girl has been recently cut, and after being applied residual henna remains on the toenails
for several weeks. For this reason, the photographers in our study photographed the feet of
nearly all girls entering primary school for the first time in the 45 schools (17). In addition
to the photographs, the medical doctors conducted the basic medical exams that are normally
sponsored by the Gezira state government. We added one question to this exam. Namely, as
part of several health-related questions, the doctors asked each girl if she had been “purified”
and, if so, when. The word “purified” is a literal translation of the Arabic word commonly used
in the local area to describe being cut. We combined data from both the photographs and the
doctors’ question to code each girl as cut or not and, by extension, to estimate cutting rates for
each community (17). This, in turn, allowed us to test if cutting rates for the communities in
our study exhibited the kind of variation we would expect if cutting practices are coordinated
social norms.
Although communities varied substantially in terms of their estimated cutting rates, they did
not vary in any way that reveals the signature of social norms that evolved within the context
of a coordination game. In particular, apart from a single community with an estimated cutting
rate of 100%, all estimated cutting rates are squarely in the interior of the unit interval (Fig. 2).
Moreover, when ordered, estimated cutting rates show no trace of the discontinuity they should
exhibit if the families in our study were coordinating on cutting practices at the community level
(Fig. 2).
To analyze cutting rates formally, we fit three different models to the data set (17). The
models differ in terms of the assumptions they make about the structure of heterogeneity among
communities. The homogeneousmodel assumes that all communities are identical, and thus the
variation in cutting rates across communities is simply sampling variation. The coordination
model assumes that two types of communities exist. Communities that have coordinated on a
non-cutting norm have a relatively low cutting rate, while communities that have coordinated
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on a cutting norm have a relatively high cutting rate. Finally, the heterogeneous model assumes
that all communities are different, they vary continuously with respect to cutting behavior, and
they cannot be sensibly grouped by cutting rate. We fit the three models to our data using
maximum likelihood. We then used an information theoretic criterion (AICc) to select the best
model (23). The model selection results are overwhelmingly clear (Table 1). The best model,
by an enormous margin, is the heterogeneous model.
Although our observed cutting rates show no trace of coordination at the community level,
an important caveat applies. Coordination and associated social norms could have been present
in marriage pools that were not the same as the geographically defined communities in our
study. If marriage pools subsume multiple communities, this is not an issue for our analysis.
A marriage pool that evolves toward a specific norm will take all the communities it includes
along with it. In principle, however, a community could also consist of two or more marriage
pools, some that coordinate on cutting and others that coordinate on not cutting. If this was the
case in the majority of the communities in our sample, the prevalence of interior cutting rates in
our data might still conceivably be consistent with the coordination model.
To address this possibility, we surveyed 2458 adults, with a roughly equal mix of men
and women, from 2458 randomly sampled households in the 45 communities in our study.
Specifically, we asked each participant if her family would refuse a marriage with another family
in her community because of the other family’s cutting practices. Every community had a
strictly interior proportion of subjects answering yes (17). This means that every community
had families who apparently insisted on similar cutting practices, and every community also
had families who did not insist.
To understand the implications of this observation with respect to a coordination game
model, we have to consider strategies defined in two dimensions. In the first dimension, families
either cut or not. In the second dimension, when negotiating marriages, families either insist
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on coordinating with respect to cutting behavior or not. This yields a total of four possible
strategies.
We developed an expanded coordination game model in which strategies are defined in
this way (17). The model is similar to the model presented at the beginning of the paper, but
it additionally allows families to vary in terms of whether they insist on coordinated cutting
practices. It also allows families to assort themselves into distinct marriage pools, one pool
that cuts and another that does not. The key conclusion from the model is that a dynamically
stable mix of cutting and non-cutting families at the community level does not exist under
any conditions (17). As a consequence, the dynamical logic of a simple coordination game
(Fig. 1) is maintained in a more complicated, more general, and more realistic game with two-
dimensional strategies, multiple marriage pools with divergent cutting practices, and assortment
within marriage pools. In this expanded coordination game model, the prediction is still that
communities should have cutting rates either close to zero or close to one. Strictly interior
cutting rates without a discontinuity, as observed in our data, are not compatible with the model.
By extension, our data do not support the view that female genital cutting in Sudan is a social
norm that evolved within the context of a coordination game.
To further substantiate this conclusion, we conducted another large-scale empirical study
based on an application of the implicit association test (24) to female genital cutting. Implicit
association tests measure associations between target stimuli, which are presented in neutral
terms, and valued stimuli, which are necessarily value-laden. In our case, the target stimuli
were drawings of girls who were identified as either cut or not cut, while the valued stimuli
were audio recordings of positive words and negative words (17). Thus, our implicit associa-
tion test was designed to measure if an individual associates a cut girl with positive words and
an uncut girl with negative words or vice versa. Implicit association tests have been repeatedly
validated and widely used to study associations related to race, sexual orientation, religion, and
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other sensitive topics in contemporary societies (24). Implicit association tests are much less
prone to producing socially desirable responses than traditional survey methods. Therefore,
after extensive development and pre-testing, we implemented our implicit association test with
2260 adult participants from 2260 randomly sampled households in the 45 communities where
we estimated cutting rates (17). As explained below, we used the resulting data to check for co-
ordination with a simple analysis that requires no information whatsoever about the relationship
between communities and marriage pools.
Scoring the implicit association test produces a single measure, D, for each participant. D
can take any value in the interval [−2, 2]. In our case, D ∈ [−2, 0) indicates negative implicit
associations with uncut girls. In contrast, D ∈ (0, 2] indicates positive implicit associations
with uncut girls. Finally, D = 0 means the participant has no implicit associations.
Our empirical approach is based on the following reasoning. If cutting practices constitute
social norms that evolved within the context of a coordination game, these norms should affect
people’s attitudes about cutting (25). Simply put, people in marriage pools with a cutting norm
should have positive attitudes about cutting, and people in marriage pools with a non-cutting
norm should have positive attitudes about not cutting. Because our implicit association test
is a measure of attitudes about cutting, a person’s score from the test should tend to reflect
the prevailing norm in that person’s marriage pool. More specifically, people from marriage
pools with a cutting norm should tend to produce negative values of D, while people from
marriage pools with a non-cutting norm should tend to produce positive values ofD. Moreover,
if all families are part of a marriage pool with one norm or the other, most people should have
either positive or negative associations with cutting, and thus values of D near zero should
be comparatively rare. By extension, if two disparate normative systems coexisted when we
sampled our study population, we should observe a bimodal distribution of D values with one
negative mode for individuals from cutting marriage pools and one positive mode for individuals
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from non-cutting marriage pools. Critically, we do not need to know the relationship between
communities and marriage pools to test this prediction. Because D is an individual measure,
and because the sign ofD has real meaning, we only need to know howD values are distributed
over the participants who took our test.
Importantly, the average value of D by community correlates negatively with our estimated
cutting rates by community (Spearman’s rank correlation, ρ = −0.493, p < 0.001). This means
that communities with relatively high estimated cutting rates had, on average, relatively positive
associations with cut girls. Communities with relatively low estimated cutting rates, in contrast,
tended to have relatively positive associations with uncut girls. This correlation shows that our
implicit association test measured attitudes that both varied across individuals and covaried in
the expected way with observed cutting rates at the community level.
The question then, as indicated above, is whether the distribution ofD values is bimodal. Far
from being bimodal, the distribution of D values is unequivocally unimodal (Fig. 3). This same
result holds for all communities if the D distributions are tested separately for each community
(17). Consequently, either across all communities or within any single community, our implicit
association test provides no evidence for two distinct normative systems. Instead, the data lead
to the same conclusion as our analysis of variation in cutting rates by community (Table 1 and
Fig. 2). Our participants varied, in short, with respect to both their attitudes and their associated
cutting practices. They did not vary, however, in a way that produced any trace of a discontinuity
that should have been present if two distinct normative systems had evolved within the context
of a coordination game.
How can all of our results be so inconsistent with the coordination view of female genital
cutting? To address this question, we would like to be very precise about what we have shown,
what we have not shown, and what it means. Emphatically, we have not shown that coordination
with respect to marriageability is irrelevant for all families in our study. Indeed, as discussed
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above, all communities have at least some families who claim that coordination matters.
Just as emphatically, however, we have shown that a simple story in which cutting families
are collectively trapped at a cutting equilibrium of a coordination game cannot be correct. As
explained, this is an extremely influential model of cutting, and it makes clear predictions. A
group of families goes one way or another. They either cut together, or they have nothing to
do with the practice. Every way we look at the problem, our data are inconsistent with this
prediction. Indeed, our data suggest that cutting families routinely live door-to-door with non-
cutting families.
In principle, the design of development programs and policy interventions should be based
on a sound understanding of the relevant decision making forces. The social norms approach
to female genital cutting and to behavioral change in other domains is perhaps best charac-
terized by the following key assumptions. People who engage in harmful practices do so be-
cause their own social interactions generate a harmful equilibrium, and they are stuck in this
equilibrium even to the extent that they are ignorant of alternatives (6, 11). By extension, the
task of the development agency is to engineer a collective deviation from the behavioral status
quo (5, 7, 9, 10, 14). If this deviation is sufficiently large and public, individual incentives to
coordinate with others will begin to support behavioral change quite apart from the activities of
the development agency itself. Thus, coordination means the development agency can use en-
dogenous social forces to promote changes in behavior that are ultimately self-sustaining. This
idea is promising in the sense that it suggests how a relatively short-term intervention can lead
to long-term improvements in human well-being. If the underlying determinant of behavior is
not coordination, however, we have no particular reason to think that such programs will work.
For example, other forces can easily dominate the need to coordinate. If some economic
or cultural force unrelated to coordination leads people to place a strong intrinsic value on
cutting, people will continue to cut even if they believe a large proportion of families have
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abandoned the practice. In such a case, coordination-based programs should not be the focus of
development interventions. Perhaps people cut because they have come to believe their religion
demands it (26). Perhaps in some societies, some men have sufficient power in the mating
market to demand costly signals of sexual fidelity, and some women have incentives to provide
these signals (26). Even more generally, families might cut because in some cultures gender
is very clearly marked, and people feel that cutting produces feminine women (26). These
are just three examples of alternate mechanisms, but they illustrate the risk for a norms-based
intervention. Specifically, they illustrate the risk that coordination could be largely beside the
point for development efforts. Coordination and related social mechanisms do affect behavior in
many situations. In a given development context, however, this does not mean that endogenous
social forces will suddenly switch from a state in which they obstruct development objectives
to a state in which they promote development objectives.
In the final analysis, rigorous empirical research is necessary to understand why harmful
practices like cutting persist and, by extension, how to design effective programs that promote
endogenous and sustainable behavioral change. Our study is the first large-scale attempt to see
if female genital cutting shows the characteristic signature of a social norm based on coordi-
nation. Although the coordination model forms the cornerstone for a number of development
programs related to cutting, our results suggest that development agencies cannot safely assume
that incentives to coordinate play an important role in a family’s final decision to cut.
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Table 1: Model selection results. We fit three models to our observed cutting rates by commu-
nity. The homogenous model assumes that all communities are identical, and observed varia-
tion is due to sampling. The coordination model assumes that two types of communities exist,
cutting communities and non-cutting communities. The heterogenous model assumes that com-
munities differ, but they cannot be sensibly grouped in terms of cutting rates. A derivative form
of Akaike’s information criterion (AICc) is our model selection criterion (23). The value of
AICc for a given model depends on the number of observations, and it also involves a penalty
that increases in the number of estimated parameters. Model fitting is based on 2265 observa-
tions. Akaike weights (wi) rescale AICc values. They sum to one and represent the proportional
weight of evidence in favor of each model (23). Here they show that the heterogeneous model
is by far the best.
Model Parameters Observations AICc wi
Homogeneous 1 2265 433.615 2.645 × 10−36
Coordination 3 2265 320.126 1.165 × 10−11
Heterogeneous 44 2265 269.774 > 0.999
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Figure 1: The dynamics of female genital cutting as a social norm based on coordination in-
centives. The solid line shows the expected payoff of cutting as a function of the proportion of
families cutting. The dashed line shows the analogous expected payoff associated with not cut-
ting. The value b is the payoff from a successful marriage, and c is the cost of cutting. Generic
dynamics (arrows) follow from any updating process that tends to increase the frequency of the
strategy with the highest expected payoff. The model has three steady states. Stable steady
states (solid circles) are at 0 and 1. An unstable steady state (open circle) is at (b + c)/(2b),
which is the distribution of strategies such that cutting and not cutting have the same expected
value. The arrows show that, if the proportion of families cutting is greater than (b + c)/(2b),
the proportion of families cutting increases through time to 1. Analogously, if the proportion of
families cutting is less than (b + c)/(2b), the proportion of families cutting decreases through
time to 0.
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Figure 2: Cutting rates for 45 communities, ordered from lowest to highest, with 95% boot-
strapped confidence intervals. The coordination game model (3, 17) predicts that cutting rates,
when ordered, exhibit a discontinuity separating non-cutting communities from cutting commu-
nities. No such discontinuity is present, and a model that assumes continuous variation among
communities fits the data far better than a model based on coordination (Table 1).
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Figure 3: Distribution of scores from the implicit association test. D is a summary score for
each participant. A score in [−2, 0) indicates that the participant has positive associations with
cut girls and negative associations with uncut girls, while a score in (0, 2] shows the opposite
set of associations. If two norms coexisted at the time of our study, the distribution of D scores
should be bimodal. It should have one negative mode for people from marriage pools with a
cutting norm and one positive mode for people from marriage pools with a non-cutting norm.
Using Hartigans’ dip test of unimodality (27), the dip statistic is Dn = 0.0035, and p = 1.
Consequently, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that our observed distribution of D values
has only one mode. The mean value of D is 0.058 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p < 0.001).
Data are from 2260 adults, with a nearly equal mix of men and women, from 2260 randomly
sampled households in 45 communities.
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